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Abstract
This paper evaluates the current competition policy framework in Turkey.
A brief history of competition policy is presented. An account of the Law
on the Protection of Competition, the main law on competition in Turkey,
is given. The structure of the Competition Authority, the body responsi-
ble for applying the Law, and the way the enforcement system works are
explained. Detailed statistics are given about all the cases submitted to
the Competition Authority by 2002. Accounts of some selected cases are
reported and a general assessment of the implementation of competition
policy is offered. The main finding of the paper is that, although there is
a movement in the right direction, competition policy implementation in
Turkey still needs to be developed and strengthened.
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1 Introduction
Since its foundation in 1923, one of the main aims of the Republic of Turkey
has been integration with the West1. For that purpose, Turkey joined newly-
emerging Western organizations like the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation (OEEC)2 in 1948, the Council of Europe (CE) in 1949, and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. However, Turkey was
ambivalent toward European Economic Community (EEC), formed under the
Treaty of Rome in 1958. This was partly because the focus at that time was on
∗The author is grateful to the Turkish Competition Authority staff for their help. Opinions
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Turkish
Competition Board or the Turkish Competition Authority staff. Any remaining errors are the
author’s.
1This paper is the first essay of the author’s doctoral dissertation, written under the su-
pervision of Prof. Stephen Martin at Purdue University, to whom it owes beyond a mere
acknowledgement.
2The OEEC was superseded by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) in 1961.
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domestic political and economic instabilities and partly because of the EEC’s
uncertain future. Nevertheless, caution was set aside when Greece, a historical
rival of Turkey, applied to EEC for associate membership in 1959. At the
time, Turkey and Greece exported similar products to Europe, Turkey’s largest
trading partner, and the Turkish government believed that Greece’s association
with the EEC was likely to pose serious political and economic problems for
Turkey in the future. Only sixteen days after the formal Greek application,
Turkey applied to the EEC for associate membership3. Thus, the Greek factor
and economic concerns lay behind Turkey’s application to the EEC.
The EEC accepted Turkey’s application and official negotiations on an as-
sociation agreement started. However, in 1960, the military intervention in
Turkey put a hold on the negotiations. Only after three years was the associ-
ation agreement (a.k.a. the Ankara Agreement) between Turkey and the EEC
finally signed on September 12, 1963. It came into force on December 1, 1964.
The agreement basically consisted of three stages: the preparatory stage, the
transitional stage, and the final stage. The establishment of a customs union
was achieved at the end of the three stages. But Turkey’s eventual aim was full
membership in the EEC.
The preparatory stage that started on December 1, 1964 was concluded on
January 1, 1970. At that date, the official negotiations between Turkey and the
European Community (EC)4 on the transitional stage began. The negotiations
led to the Additional Protocol, which was a supplement to the Association
Agreement. The Additional Protocol was signed on November 23, 1970 and
came into effect on January 1, 19735. The Additional Protocol basically laid
down the conditions, arrangements, and timetables for implementing the tran-
sitional stage referred to in Article 4 of the Association Agreement. Thus, the
transitional stage started with the Additional Protocol. The Additional Proto-
col ultimately aimed to establish a customs union between Turkey and the EC
by December 31, 1995. For that purpose, Article 43 of the Additional Protocol
anticipated a closer alignment of economic policies between Turkey and the EC:
Article 43. The Council of Association shall, within six years of
the entry into force of this Protocol, adopt the conditions and rules
for the application of the principles laid down in Articles 85, 86, 90
and 926 of the Treaty establishing the Community.
Article 85, 86, and 90 concern rules applying to undertakings. Article 85 pre-
cludes restrictive agreements between independent undertakings. Article 86
deals with abuse of monopoly or market power. Article 90 deals with public
undertakings and undertakings granted special or exclusive rights. Article 92
concerns aids granted by states. With the Additional Protocol in general and
Article 43 in particular, the foundations of Turkish competition policy were laid.
3Muftuler Bac (1997), p. 54.
4EEC was replaced by EC on July 1, 1967.
5Muftuler Bac (1997), p.59.
6These articles have been renumbered as 81, 82, 86, and 88 by the Treaty of Amsterdam.
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However, it took many years for Turkey to adopt the conditions and rules
mentioned in the article. It was only on December 13, 1994 that Turkey had
a competition law close to the spirit set in Article 43 of the Additional Proto-
col7. Three months later, on 6 March 1995, the EC-Turkey Association Council
decided to move on to the final stage of the customs union. On 13 December
1995 the Parliament gave its assent to the customs union. The decision on the
final phase of customs union came into force on 31 December 1995. Despite the
customs union, the implementation of competition policy in Turkey actually
began in 1997, when the Competition Authority was established. Thus, it is
legitimate to say that competition policy is a new experience for Turkey.
The object of this chapter is to evaluate Turkey’s experience with competi-
tion policy since 1997, mainly drawing upon the Annual Reports of the Competi-
tion Authority, the Justified Decisions of the Competition Board, and extensive
interviews and correspondence with the Authority’s competition experts. The
paper’s contribution to the literature is twofold. First, despite the recent trend
of empirical evaluations of competition policies in various countries8, it seems
that there is a gap in the literature for Turkey’s competition policy experience.
This paper aims to fill this gap. Second, most studies that evaluate competi-
tion policy rely heavily on formal documents like annual reports of competition
authorities. We believe that a better evaluation of competition policy implemen-
tation has to go beyond that. That’s why this paper digs deeper and presents
a more detailed analysis of the implementation of competition policy by going
over each publicly available decision made by the Competition Authority be-
tween 1997 and 2002. In that way, we are able to derive specific information
about the way the relevant market is defined, the degree of consensus between
the reporters and the board on cases, and average duration of cases.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a brief history of
competition policy in Turkey. Section 3 introduces the Law on the Protection
of Competition, Law No. 4054. Section 4 discusses the structure of the Turk-
ish Competition Authority and the procedures followed by it in implementing
the Law. Section 5 presents some detailed descriptive statistics about all the
cases processed by the Authority by the end of 2002. Section 6 presents some
illustrative cases. Section 7 concludes. Some important articles of the Law are
included in an appendix.
7The competition law in Turkey still does not have articles corresponding to Articles 90
and 92 of the Treaty of Rome.
8See Hoekman and Djankov (2000) for Bulgaria, Anderson and Stanbury (1998) for
Canada, Boner (1998), Dutz and Vagliasindi (2000), and Pittman (1998) for transition
economies, Borrell (1998) for Spain, the whole 21st issue of the Review of Industrial Or-
ganization for Asian economies, Gallo and Parker (2000) and Lin and Slottje (2000) for the
US, Joskov and Tsukanova (1994) and Slay and Capelik (1998) for Russia, Massey (2002) for
Ireland, Neven and von Ungern-Sternberg (1998) for Switzerland, Utton (2000) for the UK,
and Martin (1998) for several European countries.
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2 A Brief History of Competition Policy in Turkey
As stated above, Turkey’s legislative activities concerning competition laws date
back to early 1970s when it signed the Additional Protocol with the EC. In 1971,
the Turkish Ministry of Commerce organized a symposium mainly on consumer
protection9. Following the symposium, the Ministry prepared The Draft Law
on Regulating Activities Concerning Commercial Goods and Services for the
Protection of Consumers in the same year. Although the draft law was primarily
intended to protect consumers and regulate domestic markets and was far from
being a competition law, it contained the earliest fragments of such a law.
A second draft law, The Draft Law on Regulating Commerce and Protecting
Consumers, followed the first one in 1975. In the technical sense, it included the
first provisions on competition law in Turkey. For instance, Article 51 declared
that10
With this law . . . forming price, manufacture, production, service,
and distribution monopolies causing free competition in commerce to
be abolished, artificially increasing prices or service tariffs through
explicit or implicit agreements, keeping them at an increased level, or
preventing them from decreasing, and for these purposes decreasing,
stopping, or keeping at a constant level production and manufacture
or product supply, or exterminating products are forbidden.
If they carry the purposes mentioned in the first paragraph, establish-
ing companies, cooperatives, and other undertakings, merging them,
and making changes in their main contracts are not allowed, ap-
proved, and registered. Contrary transactions are void.
As can be seen, the article forbade monopolization and agreements and con-
certed practices. The draft law also anticipated heavy fines in case of infringe-
ment of the article. However, compared to a modern competition law, the draft
law in general and the article in particular were insufficient and ambiguous.
For instance, the draft law did not mention any body to implement it or any
exemptions. Also it is obvious that the article was prepared with the short-run
interests of consumers in mind since it mentioned only increased prices but not
decreased prices, which might arise in a predatory pricing case.
The Ministry later prepared The Draft Law on Protecting Integrity in Com-
merce in 1980. This third draft law was aimed at protecting a free market
system and eliminating elements adversely affecting competition. It contained
a somewhat different version of Article 51 from the earlier draft. It also dealt
with deliberately restricting or stopping production as a form of quota cartels
and refusal of sale as an abuse of dominant position in different articles.
In 1981, a fourth draft law was prepared by the Ministry under the title of
The Draft Law on Regulating Commercial Activities and Protecting Consumers.
9This section draws from Esin (1992) and the Turkish Competition Authority Annual
Reports.
10The author’s translation.
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But this draft law did not introduce much that was new and was mainly parallel
to the last one.
The years following the military intervention in September 12, 1980 saw a
new constitution in Turkey11. The new constitution was passed by a government
appointed by the military in the Turkish Parliament in 1982. The fourth part
of the Constitution, entitled Financial and Economic Provisions, was composed
of two chapters. In the second chapter, entitled Economic Provisions, Section
II, Supervision of Markets and Regulation of Foreign Trade, is Article 167 of the
Constitution and it declares that
The State shall take measures to ensure and promote the sound, or-
derly functioning of the money, credit, capital, goods and services
markets; and shall prevent the formation, in practice or by agree-
ment, of monopolies and cartels in the markets.
In order to regulate foreign trade for the benefit of the economy of
the country, the Council of Ministers may be empowered by law to
introduce or lift additional financial impositions on imports, exports,
and other foreign transactions, in addition to tax and similar impo-
sitions.
As can be seen, only the first part of Article 167 is about competition. The
second part is about foreign trade. But, unlike the second part, which empowers
the Council of Ministers to implement the law, the first part does not cite any
particular body to carry out the necessary measures. In that respect, Article
167 is ambiguous. It is also far from being a proper competition law.
The Draft Law on Protecting Consumers of October 1983 and its somewhat
different version with the same title in March 1984 prepared by the Ministry
of Commerce dealt with regulations concerning cartels and monopolies in a
separate section for the first time. Article 16 of the former draft and Article 17
of the latter, under the title of Cartel Prohibition, prohibited making implicit or
explicit agreements or connections to become dominant in markets, share them,
increase prices, or reduce the supply of goods and services with the intention
of decreasing or eliminating free competition. For the first time, Article 18
mentioned some exemptions. They were agreements that regard delivery of
and payments for goods, that are likely to bring forth new technologies and
to increase productivity, that are to public’s benefit during periods of general
stagnation in the economy, and that will help weather an economic depression
that affects most of the undertakings in a sector. On the other hand, the draft
law neither contained any articles about mergers and acquisitions nor cited any
body to implement it.
After the general elections in November 1983, Turkey went through major
changes in its economic structure. The economy became more open to foreign
trade, the state started withdrawing from the economy through privatization,
a floating exchange rate system was adopted, and the efforts of integration
11The Third Constitution.
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with the EU gained a new momentum. Partly because of this new economic
ambiance and also partly because of the criticisms directed at the earlier drafts,
the Turkish Ministry of Industry and Commerce prepared The Draft Law on
Agreements and Practices Restricting Competition in December 1984. This
draft, for the first time, separated issues related to restricting competition from
those related to protecting consumers and regulating commerce. It was also the
first independent draft law on competition issues and, unlike all the earlier draft
laws, it went to the Parliament to be legalized in December 1985. But it was
never taken up in the Parliament and fell into oblivion after the 1987 elections.
After the general elections in 1991, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce
prepared two draft laws: The Draft Law on Protecting Consumers and The
Draft Law on Protecting Competition. The latter draft law was prepared by
taking into consideration the U.S., British, German, and European Union com-
petition laws, and was very different from the earlier ones. After it was com-
pleted in July 1992, it was circulated among institutions for their opinions.
After it was finalized, it went to the Parliament and was passed in December 7,
1994 and became effective following the publication in the Official Gazette No.
22140 dated December 13, 1994.
The law anticipated a competition board and a competition authority. The
Competition Board was appointed on February 1997 and the Competition Au-
thority was established on November 5, 1997. Thus, with the establishment
of the Competition Authority the competition law system was completed and
competition policy effectively started in Turkey.
3 The Law on the Protection of Competition
This section broadly describes the legal framework of competition policy in
Turkey12. The legislation is composed of two parts: primary legislation and
secondary legislation. The primary legislation is the Law with its general and
article-by-article justifications. The secondary legislation is communique´s and
by-laws.
The aim of the Law on the Protection of Competition, Law No. 4054, is
to protect competition by ensuring necessary regulation and supervision in the
form of preventing abuse of a dominant position by undertakings holding a dom-
inant position in markets and prohibiting agreements, decisions, and concerted
practices which prevent, restrict or distort competition in goods and services
markets within the territory of the Turkish Republic. For that purpose, the
Law empowers the Competition Board, the decision making organ of the Com-
petition Authority, to perform the necessary regulation and supervision. The
law is regularly updated by Communique´s13.
We can divide the prohibitive provisions of the law into three broad cate-
gories:
12This section draws mainly from the Law on the Protection of Competition and its general
and article-by-article unpublished justifications.
13Amendments.
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• provisions related to agreements, decisions, and concerted practices which
prevent, restrict, or distort competition among undertakings in goods and
services markets within the territory of the Turkish Republic and their
exemptions;
• provisions related to abuse of a dominant position by undertakings;
• provisions related to mergers and acquisitions creating a dominant posi-
tion or strengthening an already existing dominant position and negative
clearance.
These provisions form the basis of the Law and are covered in Articles 4
through 8. Now, we will take up these articles in turn.
3.1 Agreements, Concerted Practices, and Decisions Re-
stricting Competition
Article 414 of the Law prohibits agreements, concerted practices, and decisions
among undertakings preventing, restricting, or distorting competition. Thus,
Article 4 covers actions taken by more than one undertaking. In other words, if
an action that distorts competition is taken cooperatively, it is covered by Article
4. The term “agreements” means every kind of reconcilement or conformity
that parties feel obliged to follow. It is not important whether an agreement is
written or oral or even non-binding. Even if the existence of an agreement among
undertakings cannot be determined, direct or indirect relations providing the
undertakings with a coordination or practical cooperation replacing their own
independent decisions, if they produce the same result, are forbidden. From time
to time, undertakings form associations to deal with their common problems.
These associations sometimes may prevent competition among their members
by making decisions enabling them to make more earnings. These types of
decisions are contrary to the competition system and are also forbidden.
Agreements restricting competition can be categorized as horizontal and
vertical. Horizontal agreements are agreements in the same stage in a chain
of transactions. Vertical agreements are agreements in the different stages in a
chain of transactions. It might be the case that an agreement has both horizontal
and vertical aspects. The second paragraph of the Article lists the most common
agreements restricting competition as examples and emphasizes that those types
of agreements are by themselves forbidden15. However, the list is just exemplary
and not exhaustive.
The third paragraph of Article 4 is worth noting. Agreements that Arti-
cle 4 prohibits are usually made in secret and proving their existence is very
difficult or even impossible. That’s why, given the existence of the conditions
stated in the third paragraph, undertakings are presumed to be involved in
14Article 4 corresponds to Article 81(1) (Article 85(1)) of the Treaty of Amsterdam (the
Treaty of Rome).
15See Article 4 in the appendix.
7
concerted practices. In practical terms, if an agreement cannot be proven but
price movements or supply-demand balance in a market exhibit similarities to
those markets in which competition is prevented, restricted, or distorted, then
the Law presumes that undertakings are engaged in concerted practices. Thus,
the burden of proof of the nonexistence of concerted practices is placed on the
parties involved. The aim is to prevent the Law from being unable to function
because of the difficulty of proving an agreement. We should note that there is
no article corresponding to the third paragraph of Article 4 in the competition
law of the EU.
3.2 Exemptions
Article 516, which regulates exemptions from Article 4, states that, upon appli-
cation from undertakings, the board may exempt agreements, concerted prac-
tices, and decisions from Article 4 if they (a) contribute to technological or
economic progress in production or distribution of goods and services, (b) al-
low consumers to get a share from the resulting benefit, (c) do not eliminate
competition in a substantial part of the relevant market, and (d) do not induce
a restraint on competition that is more than essential for the attainment of
the objectives set out in (a) and (b). It is important to note that all of the
conditions have to be satisfied for the board to issue an exemption.
Exemptions are given for at most 5 years. The Board may issue a conditional
exemption, which is basically an exemption decision provided that undertakings
make necessary adjustments in their agreements, concerted practices, and deci-
sions in order to satisfy certain conditions. At the end of the exemption period,
the decision may be renewed upon the application of the parties concerned if the
requirements for exemption continue to be satisfied. The Board also grant group
exemptions through communique´s to those groups whose agreements meet the
requirements.
The position of the Authority in Article 5 is explained in the unpublished
article justifications where it is stated that a rigid application of Article 4 may
cause some undesired results. For instance, some practices restricting compe-
tition may create more positive effects than negative effects. The justifications
state that these practices should be exempted from Article 4. But the justifica-
tions also note that the four conditions listed in Article 5 have to exist simulta-
neously for an exemption to be granted. First of all, it is necessary that agree-
ments, concerted practices, and decisions restricting competition create positive
effects on the economy. Exemption cannot be applied if these effects show them-
selves only as profits. It is also necessary that consumers get a fair share from
the positive effects created. If the same positive effects can be achieved with less
restriction of competition, then agreements cannot be exempted. Only necessary
and essential competition restrictions to get positive effects can be exempted.
Besides, competition should not be rooted out completely in a substantial part
of the relevant product market with these restrictions.
16Article 5 corresponds to Article 81(3) (Article 86(3)) of the Treaty of Amsterdam (the
Treaty of Rome).
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The justifications also mention the advantages of exemptions being granted
for a limited amount of time and group exemptions. That exemption decisions
are granted for a limited amount of time will give the Board a chance to monitor
changes that may result in restricting competition further in the relevant market
after the exemption decision was given. Group exemptions, on the one hand,
will bring legal certainty for these types of agreements and, on the other hand,
positive effects of these agreements will be contributed to the economy.
3.3 Abuse of a Dominant Position
Article 6 prohibits abuse of a dominant position17 by one or more undertakings
and corresponds to Article 82 (Article 86) of the Treaty of Amsterdam (the
Treaty of Rome).
The point of view of the Competition Authority in abuse of a dominant po-
sition is explained in the article justifications. It is stated that if an undertaking
grows through its internal dynamics and takes a dominant position in various
sectors, this is not against the competition laws. On the contrary, in Turkey, it
is desirable for firms to accumulate capital and increase investments. Because,
in today’s world, foreign trade rises at an increasing pace and customs barriers
are either decreased or completely eliminated through various agreements. Be-
sides, Turkey has applied to the European Union for a full membership and has
been in a customs union with it since 1996. Under these circumstances, under-
takings should have competitive power gained through growth in order to be
able to compete in the EU and in the world. On the other hand, it is forbidden
for dominant firms in a market to abuse their position to prevent, restrict, or
distort competition.
The most common abuses of a dominant position in practice are listed in
the second paragraph. This list is exemplary, not exhaustive. Abuses include
creating entry barriers, impeding the activities of other undertakings already in
the market, discrimination among peer buyers, tying, limiting resale conditions,
taking actions to obstruct competition in a market using a dominant position in
another market, and restricting marketing or technical progress in a way that
hurts consumers. In some cases, an undertaking may take a dominant position
through protection provided by laws. For instance, industrial and commercial
property rights provide such a protection. These rights should not be used to
prevent competition in any way.
In order to apply Article 6, it is important to determine whether an under-
taking has a dominant position. Market share, product differentiation, entry
barriers, vertical integration, and substitutability of the relevant product deter-
mines whether or not there is a dominant position in a specific market.
17Article 3 of the Law gives a definition of a dominant position. See the appendix.
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3.4 Mergers and Acquisitions
Mergers and acquisitions are regulated by Article 7 and Communique´s 1997/118
and 1998/419. Article 7 declares that mergers and acquisitions are against the
Law and forbidden if they create a dominant position or strengthen an already
existing dominant position in a way that substantially decreases competition in
a goods or services market in the whole or part of the country. Article 7 also
authorizes the Board to issue communique´s about what types of mergers and
acquisitions need approval in order to be legal.
The position of the Competition Authority in this article is explained in the
Article Justifications for the Law on the Protection of Competition. The Jus-
tifications state that Article 7 aims to take under control undertakings’ growth
outside their internal dynamics and, for that purpose, it prohibits achieving a
dominant position through merger or acquisition in a way that substantially de-
creases competition, even though a dominant position in itself is not forbidden
in Article 6. The Justifications declare that, as a rule, the second paragraph of
the article does not state that the Board’s approval is obligatory for mergers and
acquisitions to be legal. In other words, mergers and acquisitions can be valid
without the Board’s approval. However, the Justifications also notes that there
are some exceptions. Since invalidating mergers and acquisitions falling under
the first paragraph after they are put into effect will create problems in practice,
the second paragraph of Article 7 authorizes the Board to issue communique´s
about what types of mergers and acquisitions need approval in order to be legal.
The Board did this in Communique´ 1997/1, Communique´ on the Mergers and
Acquisitions Calling for the Authorization of the Competition Board.
Article 2 of the communique´ defines cases considered to be mergers or acqui-
sitions. According to the article, mergers of two or more previously independent
undertakings, acquisitions granting an acquirer the power to have a right in the
management, and joint ventures are covered under Article 7 of the Law. The
first paragraph of Article 4 of the communique´ determines what type of mergers
and acquisitions require permission. According to the article, if the total market
share of the undertakings that are parties to a merger or an acquisition exceeds
25% or if their total turnover exceeds 25 trillion TL20 in the relevant product
market within the whole territory of the country or a part of it, it is compulsory
for the undertakings to get permission from the Competition Board.
The last two paragraphs of Article 4 of communique´ 1997/1 explain the
Authority’s procedure for defining the relevant product and geographic markets.
The relevant geographic market is defined as a substantial part of the country21
within the meaning of the first paragraph of the article in which undertakings
are involved in the supply and demand of their goods and services, in which
the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogenous, and which can easily
18Communique´s 1998/2, 1998/6, and 2002/2 made minor changes in communique´ 1997/1.
19Communique´ 1998/5 made minor changes in communique´ 1998/4.
20The turnover threshold of 10 trillion TL in communique´ 1997/1 was replaced by 25 trillion
TL, which is approximately 15M Euros, in communique´ 1998/2.
21As will be made clear in section 5, the relevant geographic market is in practice almost
never larger than the country.
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be distinguished from neighboring areas as the conditions of competition are
appreciably different. In defining the relevant geographic market, the Authority
takes into account factors such as the nature and characteristics of the goods or
services concerned, the existence of entry barriers, of consumer preferences, of
appreciable differences in the undertakings’ market shares between neighboring
areas and the area concerned, or substantial price differences.
In defining the relevant product market within the meaning of the first para-
graph, the Authority takes into account the market comprising the goods and
services which are regarded as being the same in the eyes of consumers in terms
of their characteristics, prices and intended use, together with the goods or ser-
vices which are the subject of the merger or acquisition. The Authority also
assesses other factors that may affect the market.
A special type of acquisition is privatization. In Turkey, privatization is ad-
ministered by the Prime Ministry Privatization Administration (PMPA). Com-
munique´ 1998/4 of the Law determines the methods and principles to be pursued
by the PMPA during the course of pre-notifications and applications to the Au-
thority in order for acquisitions by way of privatization to be legally valid. The
scope of the communique´ is stated in Article 2, which declares that any acqui-
sition by way of privatization which changes control or affects decision-making
bodies, or regards production units in an undertaking comes under the scope
of the communique´. Article 2 also lists some exclusions, which include sales to
the public, sales in international markets, and turnovers to employees among
others.
Acquisitions by way of privatization within the scope of the communique´ fall
into two categories: those that are subject to pre-notification and those that
are subject to application. For the first category, which includes acquisitions
of undertakings with a market share exceeding 20% or a turnover exceeding 20
trillion TL or, even if these thresholds are not exceeded, having legal or de facto
privileges in the relevant product market, it is obligatory for the PMPA to have
recourse to the Authority’s opinion. On the other hand, for the second category,
which includes acquisitions of undertakings with a market share exceeding 25%
or a turnover exceeding 25 trillion TL, it is obligatory for the PMPA to have
the Authority’s approval.
3.5 Negative Clearances
Article 8 deals with negative clearances. It states that upon application by
undertakings or associations of undertakings, the Board, within the context of
information presented to it, may issue a negative clearance document stating
that an agreement, decision, concerted practice, or merger or acquisition is not
contrary to Articles 4, 6, and 7 of the Law.
The Board may reverse its decision under certain conditions stated in Article
13 anytime after the negative clearance document was issued. However, the
undertakings are not subject to penalties for the time interval between the date
the negative clearance document was issued and the date the Board reversed
its decision. Again the position of the Authority in Article 5 is stated in the
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justifications22:
Undertakings and associations of undertakings, in order to bring le-
gal certainty and security to their agreements, decisions, concerted
practices, or concentrations, should be able to request, by applying
to the Competition Board, a formal document declaring that their
transactions are not contrary to competition rules. This is a neces-
sity for commercial life to be free from uncertainty.
It should be emphasized that the competition law of Turkey on negative
clearance is somewhat different from that of the EU. The EU competition law
covers negative clearance under Article 2 of Regulation 17, which provides23
Upon application by the undertakings or associations of undertak-
ings concerned, the Commission may certify that, on the basis of the
facts in its possession, there are no grounds under Article [81(1)]
or Article [82] of the Treaty for action on its part in respect of an
agreement, decision or practice.
On the other hand, the Turkish competition law covers mergers and acquisitions
in addition to agreements, decisions, and practices.
4 The Competition Authority
When the Law on the Protection of Competition was passed in the Parliament
in 1994, it anticipated a Competition Board and a Competition Authority. The
Competition Board, the decision making organ of the Competition Authority, is
responsible for the enforcement of the Law and was appointed only on February
27, 1997 (a delay of 27 months). However, the Competition Authority completed
its organization within the short period of 8 months. This was announced by
a Communique´ issued as the Temporary Article 2 of the Law on November 5,
1997 and the Authority started to operate hereafter. This section surveys the
structure and procedure of the Competition Authority.
4.1 The Structure
The decision making organ of the Authority is the Competition Board. The
Competition Board is composed of one chairman, one deputy chairman, and
ten board members. The Board’s duties include, among others, making fi-
nal decisions regarding prohibited activities, assessing exemption and negative
clearance requests, allowing mergers and acquisitions, issuing communique´s, and
making necessary arrangements as to the legislation and the implementation of
the Law.
Initial examinations, preliminary research, and investigations are carried out
by the technical departments. There are four technical departments. Each
department covers certain sectors.
22Author’s translation.
23See Jones and Sufrin (2001), pp. 201-202.
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4.2 The Implementation Procedure
We now discuss the general procedures in implementing the Law by the Author-
ity. Basically, they are composed of a series of inquiries. Successive inquiries
require more information about a case. Each inquiry is decided upon by the
Board.
Under the Law, the Authority can start a case either by an application or
on its own initiative. An application is either an informing or a complaint. In
the first, an informer, not a party to a case, informs the Authority of a pos-
sible infringement. In the second, a complaint, the complainant, one or more
of the parties to a case, notifies the Authority that it is hurt by an infringe-
ment24. Applications can be made by a petition or an email. They may be
made anonymously. The Authority is obliged to examine every application. If
an application is found to be serious, this is notified to the applicant. An appli-
cation is said to be rejected if either it is notified as rejected to the applicant or
not notified within a legal amount of time. Initiators of rejected applications, if
they can prove their direct or indirect vested interests in the case, may appeal
against the rejection.
The Authority can also start a case on its own initiative based on any in-
formation or documentation, from either media news or other sources, such as
those gathered during an initial examination, preliminary research, or investiga-
tion of other cases. In principle, the Authority can directly start an investigation
upon an application. But in practice, cases, independently of their sources, go
to either initial examination or preliminary research.
Technical departments process an initial examination. The aim of an initial
examination is to see if the allegations in an application are viable. The first
step is to determine if the case falls within the scope of the act and if so, under
which article. The next step is to collect information about sectors, markets,
competitors, etc. to see if the allegations are correct. Investigated undertakings
are, in principle, unaware of the investigation at this stage. There may be on-
the-spot research if that is deemed necessary. There is no predefined deadline
but in practice this stage lasts at most 60 days. Whether an infringement is or
is not detected is indicated in the initial examination report.
It should be noted that an information note has mostly replaced the initial
examination in the last few years in order to speed up the process. It is a
requirement to present an information note to the Board at most one month
after the application. But the decision process can take at most two months. If
it takes more than a month to make a decision, the undertakings are informed
of this at the end of the first month. Whenever a decision is made within two
months, the undertakings are informed of the decision.
24There is a third form of application which is a request from the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce. But this type of application is very rare. Unless stated otherwise, an application
means an informing or a complaint from now on.
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4.2.1 Preliminary Research
Preliminary research is the stage in a case where the Board decides whether
an investigation is necessary or not. After an initial examination, if the Board
decides to continue with a preliminary research, the Board Chairman assigns one
or more competition experts as reporters. The undertakings are not informed
about the preliminary research until it starts. The reporters examine all the
undertakings at the same time. Under the Law, the maximum duration for
preliminary research is 30 days25. There is much on-the-spot research involved.
At the end of the preliminary research, the reporters present a preliminary
research report containing information gathered, every type of evidence, and
their views on the case to the Board. The Board has to gather and decide within
a maximum of 10 days whether an investigation is necessary. The Board may
be content with declaring only an opinion26. In either case, the undertakings
are informed of the result.
4.2.2 Investigation
An investigation is much more detailed than a preliminary research. If an inves-
tigation is started, the Board assigns one or more board members together with
one or more competition experts as the investigation committee. The board
member(s) run the investigation. A notification27 is sent to the undertakings
within 15 days from the date the Board decided to conduct an investigation.
Undertakings are required to submit a written defense within 30 days from the
date they receive the notification.
The committee may visit firms or plants. They have the authority to search
for documents in business headquarters. The aim is to collect as much infor-
mation as necessary to determine whether an infringement occurred or not. In
the end, they submit a report to the Competition Board. The report naturally
proposes either that an infringement occurred or not, but the decision need not
be taken collectively. Reporters have the right to oppose a decision taken by
the majority. If so, they need to offer their reasons.
The investigation report, taking into consideration the first written defense,
has to be finalized by the investigation committee within 6 months from the
date the Board decided to investigate. There might be one additional period of
6 months. When it is finalized, the report is sent to the Board and the parties,
with commercial secrets deleted, within 15 days after it is completed. The
parties are given a second chance to submit a written defense within 30 days.
The Committee attaches an appendix to the written defense explaining its view
within 15 days. There may be an oral defense, which may last at most a few days,
if the parties wish. The Board makes its final decision within 15 days following
the oral defense, evaluating the report and the defense of the defendants. The
25Most competition experts believe this is too short a time interval.
26This is usually reserved for state-owned companies.
27This is a formal document containing information about the nature of the claim, which
articles of the law are relevant in the case, and the relevant evidence.
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Figure 1: Cases Handled by the Authority Overtime
final decision is read by the Board in a meeting where the reporters and the
defendants are present. The Board writes an opinion justifying its decision.
Within 60 days after it is published in the Official Gazette, the parties may
appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals. If the Court of Appeals decides for
the Authority too, then the Authority collects the fine that was assessed. But,
on average, it takes 3 to 4 years for the Court to decide because of its heavy
workload.
5 Competition Law Enforcement: Descriptive
Statistics
In this section, we present some detailed descriptive statistics on all the appli-
cations, finalized cases, and pending cases from November 1997, the date on
which the Competition Authority started processing applications, until the end
of 2002. Figure 1 shows the total number of applications, finalized cases, and
pending cases by years. Excluding 1997, in which year the Authority operated
for only 2 months, the annual average number of applications is approximately
395, which means a little more than one application a day.
The fact that the number of applications peaked in 1998 might suggest that
the function of the new competition law was not properly understood in the
beginning.28 In fact, in the beginning years, there were too many off-the-mark
28As in the case where a complainant called the sale of bread at a low price “unfair compe-
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Figure 2: Competition Infringement Cases
applications. However, they stayed relatively low later. Figure 1 also shows that
the Authority found it hard to keep up with the applications since the number
of finalized cases has been decreasing but on the other hand the number of
pending cases has been increasing for the most recent years.
The next subsections will look at the cases in more detail, breaking them into
three parts: competition infringement cases, exemption and negative clearance
cases, and merger and acquisition cases.
5.1 Competition Infringements
With the exception of 1999, most of the applications to the Competition Au-
thority were competition infringement applications. Figure 2 shows competi-
tion infringement cases by years. As can be seen, the number of applications
increased over time, peaking in 2002. However, the number of finalized cases
was on a decline. This might be due to a shortage of staff and also the relatively
long process of handling cases.
Figure 3 further breaks down the finalized competition infringement cases.
There are three categories: finalized decisions after initial examination or pre-
liminary research / investigation (shortly, accepted), cases rejected or deemed
not worth studying (shortly, rejected), and cases that are outside the scope of
the Act (shortly, outside the scope). One thing to notice is that the number of
cases that are outside of the scope of the Act was high, with a maximum of 236
tition”.
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Figure 3: Finalized Competition Infringement Cases
cases in 1999. This might show that the role of the Law was still not properly
understood in Turkey. Another possible explanation is that firms might have
tended to file complaints in order to cause problems for their rivals. In any
case, since the marginal cost of filing a complaint is almost zero29, undertakings
did not refrain from applying even for minor cases. Whatever the reason, the
number of applications that are outside the scope of the Act declined over time.
Table 1 breaks down the accepted cases by articles of the Law. As can be
expected, most of the decisions concerned either Article 4 (concerted practices)
or Article 6 (abuse of a dominant position). The rest concerned both articles,
as in cases where undertakings abuse a dominant position achieved through
concerted practices.
As Table 1 shows, the Competition Board finalized 174 cases between Novem-
ber 1997 and December 2002. Of these 174 cases, 130 are publicly available.
Table 2 presents some summary statistics for these cases. As discussed in section
4, a case can be initiated either by an application (in the form of an informing or
a complaint) or by the Authority itself. Each case is composed of various stages.
The stages shown in the next table are initial examination (Stage I), prelimi-
nary research (Stage II), and investigation (Stage III). A case may be finalized
in each of these stages. In the table, the duration of the initial examination
stage is defined as the time interval between the date a complaint was filed and
the date a decision was made either to finalize it or to continue to preliminary
29Even an email will do.
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Table 1: Finalized Decisions by Articles of the Law
Year Article 4 Article 6 Article 4 and Article 6
1997 2 3 -
1998 3 2 -
1999 9 10 13
2000 21 16 16
2001 12 19 10
2002 18 15 5
Total 65 65 44
Source: The Competition Authority Annual Reports
research. Sometimes more than one complaint was filed with different dates
for the same case. If this is the case, we take the first complaint date as the
application date. The duration of preliminary research stage is defined as the
time interval between the date an initial examination was over and a decision
was made to continue to preliminary research and the date a decision was made
either to finalize or to continue to investigation. The duration of investigation
stage is defined as the time interval between the date a preliminary research was
over and a decision was made to continue to investigation and the date a final
decision was made on the case. We went over each of the 130 cases and Table
2 presents some descriptive statistics.
In the table, the first row shows the number of cases that falls within the
category in each column. The second row shows the mean number of days of
the cases. The third row shows the standard errors and the fourth row shows
the 10% trimmed means, a measure robust to extreme values. The fifth and
sixth rows show the minimum and maximum number of days, respectively.
As the table shows, 112 cases that fall within the first stage were decided.
The mean number of days is 104.41 and the standard error is about 94, which is
very high. Since even a 10% trimmed mean does not make much difference, we
can conclude that, the first stage, on average, takes about three months. The
reason that stage I takes so much time is that when an application is filed, it
may wait months in line to be processed. Because of the heavy workload, the
Authority discriminates between applications, processing earlier the ones that
seem more important.
Table 2 shows that there are 72 cases falling in stage II. It takes approxi-
mately 4 months on average to finalize this stage. The standard error is also very
high. This can also be seen by looking at the minimum and maximum number
of days. The maximum number of days is approximately sixty times the mini-
mum. In this stage of a case, reporters usually visit undertakings’ headquarters
or plants and try to collect information about the case.
Table 2 also shows that as the stages of a case advance, it takes longer to
finish it. Stage III is by far the longest one, approximately 15.5 months on
average lapsed before it was finalized. On the other hand, the standard error
is relatively low, suggesting that the duration of stage III is approximately the
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Table 2: Summary Statistics on the Duration of Each Stage
Number of Days
Stages: I II III All Stages
Cases 112 72 23 20
Mean 104 148 466 703
Std. Error 94 154 108 218
Trimmed Mean 94 126 469 691
Minimum 5 14 259 379
Maximum 462 831 608 1231
Source: Author’s Calculations
same for each case.
When we look at the last column, we can see that, on average, it takes about
2 years to complete an competition infringement investigation. This may not
good news for the Authority. In predatory pricing or abuse of dominant position
cases, time is very important. By the time a case is finalized, the victim might
have endured high costs which cannot be recovered later.
There are a couple of other interesting points about the Competition Board
Decisions. One of them concerns the definition of geographical markets. In
almost half of the cases (58 out of 128) the geographical market was defined as
the whole country. We should emphasize that reporters did not use quantitative
techniques in defining either product or geographical markets. That’s why it
seems that they opted for practical approaches. If the possible economic effects
of an action were likely to transcend provincial borders, they tended to define
the geographic market as the whole country. The geographic market was almost
never defined outside the country borders. Their main argument for this was
that the Law could not be applied outside Turkey. Article 2 of the Law defines
the scope and it does not explicitly imply that the Law can be applied only
inside the borders of Turkey:
. . . Agreements, decisions, and practices which prevent, distort or
restrict competition between the enterprises which operate in or affect
the goods and services markets in the territory of Republic of Turkey
. . .
However, in practice, the competition experts restrict themselves within the
borders of Turkey.
In 38 out of 128 cases, the geographic market was not even defined. For the
most of the rest, it is defined as either as a province or a group of provinces. It
seems that when reporters defined a province or a group of neighboring provinces
as the geographic market they took into consideration mostly supply-side effects.
For instance, when they define a product market, they usually define the geo-
graphic market as the area where the producer is able to supply with its existing
sales network.
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Figure 4: Exemption / Negative Clearance Cases by Years
Another point worth making is that reporter’s view on a case and the Board
decision usually coincide. In 110 out of 128 cases, the Board followed reporters’
view. In other words, 86% of the time, a case was finalized in the accord with
the reporter’s views. This is not necessarily a good or a bad thing by itself. But
when considered together with the fact that the Board usually was content with
the facts presented to them by the reporters and did not demand additional
information30, it is clear that their views were mostly shaped by those of the
reporters.
5.2 Exemptions and Negative Clearances
Figure 4 shows the breakdown of exemption/negative clearance cases by years.
The first thing to notice is that the number of pending cases is large. This
might suggest that exemption/negative clearance decisions take a long time
to make. But the pending cases lingered mostly due to the large volume of
applications in 1998, 245 to be exact. For the following years, the Authority
finalized approximately as many cases as the applications, but it could not clear
away the accumulated applications of 1998.
Table 3 further breaks down the finalized negative clearance/exemption
cases. The interesting point is that for most of the applications, exemption
or negative clearance was granted. Another interesting point is that the Au-
thority never rejected an application. The conditional decisions column shows
30Based on the interviews with the competition experts.
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Table 3: Exemption and Negative Clearance Decisions
Negative Outside
Year Exemption Clearance Conditional the Scope
Granted Granted Decisions of the Act
1997 - - - -
1998 1 11 - -
1999 11 17 21 15
2000 5 8 6 4
2001 16 13 19 4
2002 12 11 7 1
Source: The Competition Authority 4th Annual Report
the applications that were acceptable provided they satisfy some requirements.
Table 4 shows summary statistics on negative clearance/exemption cases. It
seems that the Authority handled these cases relatively quickly since their mean
duration was one and a half months.
We should note that the minimum duration column might give the incorrect
impression that some cases were finalized in a few days. As we stated earlier,
some applications are renewed over and over again. The Board Decisions usually
recorded the first application date. But for some applications the application
date recorded was the last application date before a decision was made on the
cases. So it is possible that there was a renewed application one day before a
decision was made for this particular case, which went into the record as the
application date. That’s why it seems that it took only one day to finalize.
Bearing that in mind, the mean duration column must be interpreted as a
lower bound. As to the maximum duration of 760 days, it is possible that this
application waited a long time before it was finally taken up. In brief, the
maximum and minimum duration statistics should be interpreted cautiously.
Still, we believe that the summary statistics figures in Table 4 are reasonably
correct since there are only a few late-record cases.
Table 5 shows the sectoral breakdown of negative clearance/exemption cases.
Unfortunately, there was no systematic sectoral distribution of the cases either
in the annual reports or in the board decisions. In this paper, we prepared
the sectoral breakdown tables based on the information provided in the board
decisions, which were usually detailed enough, and our knowledge of the Turkish
economy. We used International Standard Industrial Classification Revision 3.1
(ISIC Rev. 3.1) one-digit sectors. As can be seen in Table 5, most of the 149
cases, approximately 76%, were either from manufacturing sector or wholesale
and retail trade sector.
As in the competition infringement cases, Turkey was defined as the geo-
graphical market in most of the negative clearance/exemption case, 91 to be
exact. In 49 cases, the geographic market was not even mentioned. For the
rest, it was either provinces or regions.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Negative Clearance/Exemption Cases
Number of Duration Duration Min. Max.
Cases Mean Standard Error Duration Duration
149 46 68 1 760
Source: Author’s calculations
5.3 Mergers and Acquisitions
Figure 5 shows merger and acquisition applications, finalized cases, and pending
cases by years. As can be seen in the figure, applications steadily increased over
time, with the exception of 2001, in which year the Turkish economy experienced
one of the worst recessions in its history. A possible explanation behind the
increasing trend in the applications might be the fixed 25 trillion TL turnover
threshold set in 1998 which brought an increasing number of transactions under
the scope of the Law because of the inflationary Turkish economy. However, the
Authority succeeded in keeping up with the increased number of applications.
Although the number of applications was almost always higher than the number
of finalized cases, the pending cases did not accumulate over time.
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Figure 5: Merger / Acquisition Cases by Years
Table 6 breaks down the finalized cases. A finalized case may end up either
approved, rejected, or it may be classified as falling outside the scope of the Act.
There are two types of approvals: (unconditional) approval and conditional ap-
22
Table 5: Sectoral Breakdown of Negative Clearance/Exemption Cases
Sector Number of Cases
Agriculture, Hunting, & Forestry 1
Mining & Quarrying 1
Manufacturing 41
Construction 1
Wholesale & Retail Trade 72
Hotels & Restaurants 4
Transport, Storage & Communications 10
Financial Intermediation 10
Real Estate, Renting & Business Activities 8
Health & Social Work 1
Total 149
Source: Author’s calculations
Table 6: Finalized Merger and Acquisition Cases
Conditionally Outside the Scope
Year Approved Approved Rejected of the Act
1997 1 - - 4
1998 25 6 - 21
1999 31 1 1 43
2000 46 3 1 51
2001 39 4 - 45
2002 54 6 - 42
Source: The Competition Authority 4th Annual Report
proval. Conditional approval is an approval provided that one or more articles31
in a transaction contract are amended to comply with the Law. In most of cases,
it was required that a time limit not to compete between undertakings was re-
duced. For instance, in an acquisition case, the transaction contract may set
a time limit of 20 years for the parties not to compete with each other. The
Authority may approve the acquisition provided that the time limit is decreased
to, for instance, 3 years. The cases that fell outside the scope of the Act were
cases that either are not covered under Article 2 of communique´ 1997/1 or were
not subject to permission from the Authority as stated in Article 4 of the same
communique´.
The most striking feature of the table is that, like exemption and negative
clearance applications, most of the merger and acquisition applications that
were not outside the scope of the Law were approved. It is interesting to note
that only two cases out of 424 applications were rejected between 1997 and
2002. One of them concerned the privatization of a fertilizer company32 and
31They are called ancillary restraints.
32We will analyze this case in section 6.
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Table 7: Nature of Transactions
Merger/ Joint
Year Acquisition Privatization Venture
1997 1 - -
1998 20 8 3
1999 26 1 6
2000 41 6 3
2001 37 - 5
2002 55 - 5
Source: The Competition Authority 4th Annual Report
the case was rejected by the Authority on the grounds that the acquisition would
create a dominant position in the relevant market. The other case concerned a
joint venture among 38 LPG (liquid petroleum gas) companies. The Authority
rejected it on the grounds that the transaction was actually a concerted practice
under the scope of Article 4 of the Law.
Another striking feature of Table 6 is the large number of cases that were
outside the scope of the Act. Most of them were cases that did not violate
Article 4, although covered under Article 2, of communique´ 1997/1. The main
reason was probably that undertakings could not be sure whether the transac-
tion exceeded the market share or turnover thresholds since it depends on how
one defines the relevant market.
Table 7 shows the nature of transactions in the cases that fell within the
scope of the Act. As can be seen, most of the transactions were either merger
or acquisition cases. Actually, majority of them, approximately three fourth,
were acquisition cases. Privatization cases constituted the smallest part. One
explanation for the small number of privatization cases is that not every type
of privatization falls under the scope of the competition law33.
At the time of writing, 218 board decisions regarding merger and acquisition
cases were publicly available. Table 8 presents summary statistics on the dura-
tion of these cases. The most quickly processed cases are merger and acquisition
cases. On average, it took one to one and half months to finalize them. Com-
pared to competition infringement decisions, these decisions took considerably
less time. The main reason is that the decision making processes are different.
In competition infringement cases, there may be up to three stages where each
one of them may take months. On the other hand, in merger/acquisition cases,
there is one stage where the Board make a decision after reporters finish their
report.
Privatization decisions, although constituting the smallest part, had the
longest average duration, approximately 5 months. The reason might be that
privatization is a sensitive issue in Turkey and the Authority took care not to
make a controversial decision. The last column shows that the longest decision
was a privatization decision which lasted more than two years. That was one of
33See the discussion at the end of section 3.4.
24
Table 8: Summary Statistics for Merger/Acquisition Cases
Duration Duration Min. Max.
Type Number Mean Standard Error Duration Duration
Merger 19 33 28 3 123
Acquisition 167 41 47 1 349
Privatization 8 151 263 13 760
Joint Venture 24 52 39 15 206
Overall 218 46 68 1 760
Source: Author’s calculations
Table 9: Sectoral Breakdown of Merger/Acquisition Cases
Sector ME AC PR JV Total
Agriculture, Hunting, & Forestry 1 2 - - 3
Mining & Quarrying 1 1 - - 2
Manufacturing 10 101 3 15 129
Electricity, Gas, & Water Supply 1 4 - - 5
Construction - 1 - 1 2
Wholesale & Retail Trade - 24 1 2 27
Hotels & Restaurants - 1 - - 1
Transport, Storage & Communications 2 12 3 - 17
Financial Intermediation 1 15 1 4 21
Real Estate, Renting & Business Activities 3 2 - - 5
Health & Social Work - 2 - 1 3
Other Activities - 1 - - 1
Total 19 166 8 23 216
Source: Author’s calculations
ME: Merger, AC: Acquisition, PR: Privatization, JV: Joint Venture
the two cases rejected by the Authority under Article 7. It also was the most
detailed decision in terms of industry analysis.
Table 9 breaks down the cases into sectors. Note that the total number of
cases in the last column is 216 instead of 218. The reason is that we were not
able to determine the sectors in 2 cases due to insufficient information in their
board decisions.
Not surprisingly, manufacturing took the first place in the total number of
the board decisions. It constituted approximately 60% of all the cases. The
share of acquisitions in manufacturing cases were approximately 80%. In manu-
facturing, 41 cases concerned consumer products where examples are food, home
appliances, and automobiles, 77 cases concerned producer products where ex-
amples are auto parts, cement, chemicals, and construction equipments, and
11 cases concerned both consumer and producer products where examples are
hairdressing products, (LPG) liquid petroleum gas, and glass products for which
there is demand from both consumers and producers.
25
Wholesale and retail trade took second place and constituted 12.5% of all
the cases. Acquisition cases constituted the largest part, 89% to be precise, in
this sector too. Of the 27 wholesale and retail decisions, 13 concerned consumer
products like supermarkets and food retail stores, 9 concerned producer prod-
ucts like wholesale of construction equipment, auto parts, and grease, and 5
concerned both consumer and producer products like distribution of LPG and
gasoline.
Financial intermediation took the third place and its share was approxi-
mately 10%. Acquisitions constituted the largest part in this sector too with a
share of 71%. Of the 21 decisions in this sector, 12 concerned consumer prod-
ucts where most of them were consumer credit cards and alike, 8 concerned pro-
ducer products where examples are investment banking and intellectual prop-
erty rights, and 1 case concerned both producer and consumer products where
a bank was acquired with all of its assets and liabilities. Overall, 80 board de-
cisions concerned consumer products, 113 concerned producer products, and 23
concerned both consumer and producer products.
There are a few other interesting points about the board decisions on merg-
ers and acquisitions. One of them is the degree of compliance between reporters
and the board. In 206 out of the 218 cases, the board followed reporter’s views.
The degree of compliance is approximately 95%. This exceeds even the degree
of compliance in the competition infringement cases, which was 86%. The im-
plication of this finding is that the best chance of undertakings to tip the scale
to their benefit is to try to convince reporters in written or oral argument that
a concentration is either not covered in the Law or, even if it is, it does not ex-
ceed the turnover or market share thresholds. Also cooperation with reporters
is an advantage for undertakings. There is one case where reporters were denied
information and then they demanded an investigation from the board in their
report rather than simply applying Article 7.
Another interesting point is about the relevant geographic market definition.
In 146 out of the 218 cases, the relevant geographic market was defined as the
whole country. This makes 67%, which is higher than the ratio of 45% in the
competition infringement cases. Actually the ratio might be even higher since
the relevant geographic market was not even discussed in 53 cases. Thus, in
91% of the merger and acquisition cases, the relevant geographic market was
either defined as Turkey or was nor discussed at all. For most of the rest, it was
either one or more provinces or regions. In only one case, it was defined as the
European Union. Except that case, the largest relevant geographic market was
Turkey.
6 Some Significant Cases Examined
In this section, we examine some significant cases to illustrate the competition
policy implementation in Turkey.
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Table 10: Newspapers, Owners, and Categories
Newspaper Owner News Category
Hu¨rriyet Dogˇan Political
Milliyet Dogˇan Political
Sabah Bilgin Political
Fanatik Dogˇan Sports
Taraftar/Fotomac¸ Bilgin Sports
Source: The Competition Board Decisions
6.1 Cases Investigated under Article 4
Concerted Practices in the Newspaper Market: The allegation in the
newspaper market investigation was that Hu¨rriyet Gazetecilik ve Matbaacılık
A.S¸34 (Hu¨rriyet), Milliyet Gazetecilik A.S¸35 (Milliyet), Sabah Yayıncılık A.S¸36
(Sabah), and Simge Yayıncılık ve Dagˇıtım A.S¸37 (Simge) determined the prices
of Hu¨rriyet, Milliyet, Sabah, Taraftar-Fotomac¸, and Fanatik newspapers through
concerted practices in the daily political and sports newspaper markets. It
started with a complaint from Uluslararası Moda Yayıncılık A.S¸38 (UMYAS¸)39.
The case actually concerned two big media groups: Bilgin and Dogˇan. Table 10
shows the newspapers, the media group they belong in, and their news category.
Before going into the details of the case, we shortly present the chronologi-
cal order of the events. On May 4, 1998, UMYAS¸ filed a petition stating that
Hu¨rriyet, Milliyet, and Sabah had been increasing their prices at the same rate
at the same day or at subsequent days for a while and they had succeeded this
through an association established among them. Upon this petition, the Com-
petition Board decided to start a preliminary research40. After examining the
preliminary research report, the Board decided to start an investigation about
Hu¨rriyet, Milliyet, Simge41, and Sabah based on Article 4(a). The undertakings
were informed of the investigation and demanded to send their first written de-
fenses within 30 days. Approximately a year later, the investigation report was
finalized and was notified to the Board members and the undertakings. In the
report, the investigation committee took the view that Dogˇan and Bilgin Groups
determined the prices of newspapers and some sale conditions in the political
newspapers and sports newspapers markets through concerted practices replac-
ing their independent behaviors, that their action was against Article 4(a), and
should have been fined in accordance with Article 16, paragraph 2.
34Hu¨rriyet Journalism and Printing Inc.
35Milliyet Journalism Inc.
36Sabah Publications Inc.
37Simge Publication and Distribution Inc.
38International Fashion Publications Inc.
39In the justified decision of the Competition Board, it was not clear why it would be in
the interest of UMYAS¸ to file the complaint.
40It is obvious that the Board took the petition seriously since it skipped the initial exam-
ination stage.
41Simge belongs to Dogˇan Group.
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At this point the undertakings were given 30 days to send their second writ-
ten defenses. After requesting and receiving 20 additional days, the undertak-
ings sent their second defenses to the Authority. The investigation committee
notified an additional written view to the defenses. And the undertakings sent
their rejoinders to the view. Finally, on July 5, 2000 the undertakings orally
defended their cases and on July 17, 200042 the Board issued its final decision.
We are going to present the case first from the committee’s point of view
and later from the undertakings’ point of view. Lastly, we are going to present
our standpoint in the case.
During the investigation, the investigation committee determined that the
relevant product markets were daily national political newspapers and daily
national sports newspapers. Hu¨rriyet, Milliyet, and Sabah were treated as a
separate category under the first market taking into consideration publication
policy, consumer loyalty, price, advertising capacity, consumer reaction to price
changes, and the stable trends of the newspapers in the market. The committee
also determined that the relevant geographic market is the whole country based
on the fact that the newspapers were published and sold countrywide.
The reporters inspected the headquarters of each newspaper. The commit-
tee’s main evidence of a concerted practice was some notes of meetings they
found in various places. When they inspected Hu¨rriyet, they detected a Board
of Execution decision in the bureau of a member of the Board of Directors includ-
ing, among other things, a meeting with Sabah on fixing advertising prices43.
However, the staff refused to give a copy of the decision to the reporters.
When the committee inspected Milliyet, they found some decisions of the
Board of Execution meetings. These documents formed the core of the commit-
tee’s case. One of them included the following lines: ”Besides, Sabah Group’s
proposal to increase [the price] to 125,000 TL44 from the beginning of September
on was discussed.” Another one was ”Agreed with Sabah Group, it was decided
to increase the prices of Fotomac¸ and Fanatik newspapers from 40,000 TL to
50,000 TL from the first of September.”. Although it was not explicitly men-
tioned in the Competition Board Decisions, it is apparent that the committee
was not able to find any evidence in the headquarters of Sabah.
Beside the findings in the inspections, another main argument of the com-
mittee was that the (simple) correlations among the prices of the newspapers
were very high. The second column of Table 11 shows the price correlations as
calculated by the Authority and confirmed by us45. It is obvious that the prices
of Hu¨rriyet and Milliyet are highly correlated. However, the price of Sabah is
not too highly correlated with those of Milliyet and Hu¨rriyet. Figure 6 shows
the daily nominal prices of the newspapers over time.
42Note that the case lasted about two years since the application date and this is consistent
with our findings in the earlier section.
43This is the reporters’ claim.
44Turkish Liras.
45The use of simple correlation coefficient in antitrust cases has some serious problems as
documented in various studies. For example, see of Fair Trading (1999), 53-55.
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Figure 6: Price Movements of Newspapers over Time
Table 11: Newspapers and Price Correlations
Newspapers Simple Correlations Partial Correlations
Hu¨rriyet - Milliyet 0.99 0.96
Hu¨rriyet - Sabah 0.91 0.61
Milliyet - Sabah 0.90 0.57
Source: Author’s Calculations
The Authority determined that the companies have different cost figures46.
That’s why it rejected the argument of the parties that their prices were simi-
lar and their price changes were simultaneous because they obeyed similar cost
structures. The Authority dismissed this argument on the grounds that, al-
though the circulation revenues are similar for each company, their advertising
revenues are different and this difference affects cost structures and thus price.
Figure 7 shows the revenues of the newspapers for 1997.
Among all the newspapers, only Sabah sent a first defense. Sabah’s defense
was mainly that costs and prices were similar in the newspaper industry because
they were in a similar position in acquiring raw materials and that the committee
46The Authority probably based this argument on accounting costs, not on economic costs.
If the firms use different accounting practices, the different cost structures argument may not
be valid. Besides, selling newspapers is not the sole activity of these companies and we are
not sure the Authority took the necessary measures to single out the costs of publishing and
selling newspapers from the costs of other activities, which is a difficult task.
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Figure 7: Newspapers and Their Revenues in 1997
did not find any evidence against Sabah. The newspapers presented a detailed
common defense after the investigation report and during the oral defense. Their
main arguments after the investigation can be summarized as follows:
• Since Hu¨rriyet and Milliyet are in the same economic unit47, it is natural
that they regularly meet and make common decisions,
• The Authority should look at the results, not the findings of the investi-
gation48,
• If it does not harm other undertakings, the concerted practice does not
restrict competition,
• The present case exhibits similarities to Ahlstro¨m Oy v. Commission
cases49, and the European Court of Justice overruled the Commission’s
decision,
• That the price increases, from time to time, happened to be at the same
dates and that they were aware of each other’s actions did not harm con-
sumers and did not create entry barriers.
The undertakings’ main arguments in the oral defense were that
47Dogˇan Group.
48They gave some European Commission decisions as examples.
49Wood pulp decisions.
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Table 12: Fines in the Newspaper Investigation
Newspaper Fine (Billion TL) Fine ($)
Hu¨rriyet 246.143 393,409
Milliyet 177.811 284,194
Sabah 183.397 293,122
Simge 35.779 57,185
Source: The Competition Board Decisions.
• Price is not the determining factor in newspaper competition,
• Newspapers compete for service, not for price,
• Neither the prices increased as to harm consumers nor decreased as to
create entry barriers,
• There was neither an aim to restrict competition nor an outcome to the
same effect.
The Authority concluded that the undertakings infringed Article 4(a) and
fined the companies applying Article 16. It fined the companies with an amount
of 0.5% of their 1997 turnovers. Table 12 shows the fines both in TL and dollars.
The high price correlation argument of the Authority has some serious prob-
lems. First of all, the prices are nominal, not real. This means that they include
a strong increasing trend, as shown in Figure 6, because of the high inflation
in Turkey, which makes the prices seem more correlated than they actually are.
In that case, from a statistical point of view, a partial correlation coefficient,
taking the increasing time trend into account, rather than a simple correlation
coefficient would be a better measurement among the prices. The last column
of Table 11 shows our partial correlations after taking out the “latent” effects
of time. As can be seen, the correlations are considerably lower, especially be-
tween the price of Sabah and those of the other newspapers50. Besides, even if
one accepts the Authority’s simple correlation argument, a stronger argument
that could have been made by the committee would be comparing the price
correlations of the newspapers to those of other newspapers that do not be-
long to Bilgin or Dogˇan groups and trying to show that these correlations were
lower. Still another problem with the price correlation argument, stated by
the newspapers in their defense but rejected by the Authority, is the fact that
some common cost items exist in producing and distributing newspapers. For
instance, newspapers use similar types of paper in production. Paper produc-
tion is run and paper prices are determined mostly by the state in Turkey. It is
unlikely that any newspaper has a buying power in the paper market. Another
common cost item is gasoline prices since newspapers are mainly distributed by
trucks to vendors. Thus, we believe that the argument made by the newspapers
50A better method would be deflating the prices and then estimating a simple correlation
coefficient but we do not have the data necessary to carry out such a task.
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that the prices are correlated because of similar cost items holds up although it
was rejected by the Authority.
The defense argument of the newspapers that neither consumers nor other
newspapers were hurt is worth consideration. Indeed, consumers actually gained
by occasional price declines as shown in Figure 6. These declines were not preda-
tory since neither of them drove other newspapers out of the market. Also, from
the authority’s point of view, these newspapers were in a separate product mar-
ket from others, which rules out any predatory behavior since there is no other
newspaper in the market to drive out. As to price increases, one can take them
as a result of the concerted practices. However, in the past, many newspapers in
Turkey, including Hu¨rriyet, Milliyet, and Sabah, offered promotions where con-
sumers collected coupons, cut out of the newspapers they buy, and exchanged
them for some items like utensils or various domestic products. During these
promotions, newspapers increased their prices. That’s why the occasional price
increases in Figure 6 also reflected cost increases due to promotions. Since these
promotions were highly successful, we can say that the price increases did not
actually hurt consumers.
It is hard to say more without knowing the details of the case. In the end,
we believe the Authority made the right decision. In our opinion, the strongest
piece of evidence in the Authority’s hands was the meeting notes. The notes
showed that there was some information exchange about price determination
among the companies, which is against the Law.
6.2 Cases Investigated under Article 6
Abuse of Dominant Position in Coal Market: An interesting case con-
cerned the sale of coal for household use in Ankara. In 1980s, some cities in
Turkey struggled with air pollution. The main culprit was believed to be low-
quality domestic coal for household use. Since Ankara, the capital city of Turkey,
is surrounded by high mountains and thus vulnerable to inversion, it was one of
the cities most affected by the air pollution. Domestic coal was far from meeting
the necessary quality. When the pollution started to threaten human health, it
was decided in 1986 to use imported coal in Ankara, along with other cities ex-
periencing air pollution. The Ministry of Environment determined the general
characteristics to be satisfied of imported coal. Based on these qualifications,
the General Hygiene Board of the Province of Ankara (GHBPA), a board work-
ing under the Governorship of Ankara, set the necessary qualifications, taking
into consideration the city’s special pollution situation. The right to import and
sell coal was granted to the Ankara Municipality. The Municipality established
Belko in 1986. Almost all of its capital was owned by the Ankara Municipality.
Belko had the exclusive right, granted by the GHBPA, to import coal51 in order
to sell it within the borders of Ankara. The monopoly right was given in order to
bar the entry of low-quality coal into Ankara and, thus, to create pollution-free
air. Belko also had operations in various product markets like running quarries,
51Russia and South Africa are the two sources of imported coal in Turkey.
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producing and selling asphalt, and running an insurance agency, among others.
Let’s first present a chronological order of the events. The complaint was
lodged by a person on June 25, 1999. It had two parts. The first concerned
the monopolization of the coal market in Ankara by giving the exclusive rights
to import and sell coal to Belko and denying those rights other importers. The
second one concerned high prices charged by Belko abusing its monopoly posi-
tion.
The Authority launched an initial examination. The initial examination
report was finished on July 15, 1999. The report, although stated that the
monopoly right of Belko was out of the scope of the Law since it was granted
by the Governorship of Ankara, proposed a preliminary research in order to
understand whether Belko charged high prices. Thus the report changed the
case from monopolization into abuse of a dominant position. The next day the
Board decided to start a preliminary research in order to determine whether it
is necessary to start an investigation.
In the preliminary research report, the geographic market was determined
as the borders of the province of Ankara and the relevant product market was
determined as bulk and bagged piece coal meeting standards determined by the
GHBPA for household use. The report claimed that Belko sold its coal at a
price that was 60-70% higher than those at which similar coal was sold in other
cities. The report cited that the price of coal in Ankara, which is located in the
mid-Turkey, was $180 per ton on November 1999. On the other hand, the prices
of coal with similar qualities were $120 in Polatlı, a city very close to Ankara,
$112 in I˙stanbul, located in the north-west of Turkey, $117 in Sivas, located in
the mid-east of Turkey, and $132 in Kayseri, located in the mid-south of Turkey.
The report attributed these price differences to Belko’s monopoly position. In
the report, it was claimed that Belko pays more for coal than other companies
in various cities. The report also found out that despite the fact that Belko sells
coal at high prices in Ankara, it incurs losses.
On December 8, 1999, the Authority decided to start an investigation after
studying the preliminary research report and demanded Belko to send its first
written defense. The investigation report was finished on September 6, 2000.
The investigation report stated that Belko was at liberty to set coal prices
between the summer of 1996 and June 18, 2000 on which date the GHBPA’s
decision to determine coal prices by a commission under the chairmanship of
the assistant governor of Ankara went into effect. The report claimed that
Belko abused its dominant position by charging high prices. The reason was
that Belko, consciously or unconsciously, did not show maximum care to the
company’s interests in purchasing coal and in the formation of other cost items
and thus had higher operating costs than necessary. The report also stated that
Belko should have been fined in accordance with Article 16.
Belko was notified of the investigation report and was asked to send a second
written defense. After Belko sent its second written defense, the investigation
committee added its supplemental view, and Belko sent a final defense. Belko
also orally defended on March 26, 2001. The Board issued its final decision on
April 6, 2001. As a result of the investigation, the Authority concluded that
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Belko abused its dominant position. The main argument of the Authority was
that Belko, through inefficient operations during importing and selling coal,
caused costs to be higher than they ought to be. It was also noted that Belko
reflected its costs from other operations to coal operations. The Authority took
two measures. First, it fined Belko about 41 Billion Turkish Liras52. Second,
it informed the GHBPA, via a declaration of opinion, of the possible ways to
open up the coal market in Ankara into competition. The GHBPA, as a result
of the Authority’s declaration of opinion, decided to rescind the monopoly right
granted to Belko on November 2, 2001.
The Authority’s main argument in the case was directed towards Belko’s
high costs53. The costs were divided into two parts: costs of coal procurement
and Belko’s own operational costs. For the first one, the Authority claimed that
Belko procured coal at relatively higher prices than the importers in other cities.
The latter costs were divided into personnel costs, storage costs, and cost due
to exchange rate differences. The Authority claimed that Belko’s personnel was
too large. Another claim by the Authority was that Belko kept higher stocks
than necessary. Finally, the Authority claimed that Belko incurred high costs
due to exchange rate differences because it bought coal with a maturity of 360
days but sold coal in installments.
The main lines of Belko’s defence against the Authority’s accusations were as
follows. Belko claimed that the Authority’s price comparisons with other cities
did not reflect the facts because these cities did not experience as much air
pollution as Ankara did and the importers did not face serious quality controls.
As to the high personnel costs, Belko claimed that it took radical measures like
privatization to solve the problem. Belko also asserted that it had to keep high
stocks because it had been entrusted with an important task and simply could
not risk being unable to supply coal. Finally, Belko claimed that it had to make
long-term purchases because of its insufficient financial capitals.
First of all, we should stress that Belko’s situation is special. Belko is a
company owned by a municipality and has the exclusive rights. The Turkish
Competition Law lacks any articles dealing specifically with undertakings with
special or exclusive rights54. Secondly, unlike Article 82(a) of the Treaty of
Amsterdam, Article 6 of the Law does not cite excessive pricing as an abuse of
dominant position. However, in the article-by-article justifications of the Law,
it is stated that the list is not exhaustive but exemplary.
In this case, one needs to answer the following two questions. First, was
Belko in a dominant position? The answer is definitely yes. Second, did Belko
abuse its dominant position? In order to answer this question, we need to
determine what constitutes an abusive conduct. Examples of abusive conduct
are excessively high pricing, discriminatory pricing, predatory pricing, refusal
to supply, or inability to supply through inefficiency. None of these happened in
this case. Article 6 is directed towards conduct which might be an abuse. In this
case, there is nothing that shows that the real conduct of Belko was to abuse
52Approximately 34 thousand dollars at the time.
53It seems that the Authority examined Belko’s accounting records in much detail.
54Article 90 in the Treaty of Rome.
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its dominant position. Excessive pricing was not a conduct deliberately chosen
by Belko. It may be true that Belko operated inefficiently and that caused the
coal prices to be high in Ankara. But it is not up to a competition authority
to fix this problem. It is up to the Governorship of Ankara, which granted
the monopoly right to Belko. One question arises. Is the type of auditing the
Authority did with Belko really a competition authority’s job? Our answer is
no. Analyzing a company’s books and pointing out the problems ex ante has
nothing to do with competition.
There are a couple of points we should make. It seems that the Authority
disregarded the fact that Belko had to incur extra costs in order to keep Ankara
free of smuggled coal. Being the second most populous city in Turkey55, Ankara
was a more profitable target for coal smugglers than the surrounding cities.
Besides, opening up the coal market to other firms may not be the right decision
for Ankara and may take the city back to the days of pollution. The main reason
is that each new firm will have less interest in guarding the market from illegal
or low quality coal. It is possible that coal consumers may end up paying less
for coal but more for health. Another important point is that some of the costs
Belko incurred were hardly avoidable. The degree of uncertainty in business
life is high in Turkey. Exchange rates kept increasing, with occasional jumps,
in the 1990s in an unpredictable manner. Since Belko had to pay for coal in
dollars, it brought additional burden on its budget when dollar appreciated.
Also demand for coal was not perfectly predictable. In Ankara, the demand for
coal for household use has decreased over time because of the recent switching
to natural gas and that may have caused some unexpected increases in stocks.
However, Belko always had to keep extra stocks as a precaution. The Authority
disregarded uncertainty in its assessment of costs.
It is our belief that the penalty decision was not correct because the Author-
ity failed to present enough evidence on the issue and nothing in the Authority’s
case against Belko showed that Belko’s conduct was an abuse of its dominant
position. The final situation in the case is a bit ambiguous. The competition
experts we interviewed claimed that Belko was no longer a monopoly. However,
Belko still claims56 that it is the only company that has the right to import
and sell coal in Ankara. In fact, Belko, jointly with Vakıflar Bankası A.S¸.57,
established a company, Vakbel, in 1995. Vakbel bought two coal mines in South
Africa in order to decrease costs in coal procurement.
6.3 Cases Investigated under Article 7
Competition Policy and Privatization: The case concerned the takeover
of I˙stanbul Gu¨bre Sanayii A. S¸.58 (I˙gsas¸) by Toros Gu¨bre ve Kimya Endu¨strisi
A.S¸.59 (Toros). The case was initiated on October 5, 1998, by the High Board
55Istanbul being the first.
56Through its web site http://www.belko.com.tr/.
57Vakıflar Bank Inc.
58 I˙stanbul Fertilizer Industry Inc.
59Toros Fertilizer and Chemical Industry Inc.
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of Privatization (HBP), which demanded the Competition Board’s view on the
privatization of 99.98% shares of I˙gsas¸, which is a government-owned company
operating in the fertilizer industry. We first briefly discuss fertilizers and the
Turkish fertilizer industry and then present the Authority’s decision and our
assessment of the case.
Plants need two types of nutrients: macro-nutrients and micro-nutrients.
Plants need macro-nutrients in large amounts. Macro-nutrients are nitrogen
(N), phosphorus (P), and potassium60 (K). Plants need micro-nutrients in small
amounts. A typical bag or bulk of artificial fertilizer61 will contain macro-
nutrients, micro-nutrients, and filler material. Filler material allows for even
application of the nutrients across the fertilized area.
Although artificial fertilizers come in two physical forms, liquid (or fluid)
and solid (or dry), it seems that only solid fertilizers are used in Turkey. Solid
fertilizers are sold in two forms: bulk and bag. The bulk materials are generally
less expensive and easier to handle, especially when large quantities are used.
Fertilizers are either single-nutrient or multi-nutrient. Single-nutrient fertilizers
are nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium. Multi-nutrient fertilizers include at
least two of the above three nutrients. There are subgroups in each single- and
multi-nutrient fertilizer. For instance, among nitrogen fertilizers are ammonium
sulfate (AS), ammonium nitrate (AN), urea, and calcium ammonium nitrate
(CAN).
Fertilizer supply in Turkey has two sources: domestic production and im-
ports. Domestic producers are of two types: those for whom fertilizer is the
main line of business and those for whom fertilizer is the secondary line of busi-
ness. Importers are also of two types: those which are also domestic producers
and those which are only importers. The number of producers has been fixed in
nine since 1981, the year in which the last entry into the market occurred. For
the six62 of the nine producers, fertilizer is the main line of business. Imports
are approximately a third of total sales. But around two third of the imports is
done by the domestic producers. It is interesting to note that fertilizer produc-
ers are also the largest importers. This may be a result of government policies
since government subsidizes both domestic sales and imports.
Buyers of fertilizers are farmers. Farms in Turkey are mostly small family
businesses. Since farmers, although small in scale, are large in numbers, they
have political power as a group. That’s why government intervention is high in
the fertilizer industry. Government acts as input supplier, producer, distributer,
and regulator in the industry. For instance, four of the nine domestic producers
belong to the government. Also the main raw material in fertilizer production,
natural gas, is provided by Botas¸, a government-owned company. The Turkish
fertilizer industry is a heavily subsidized industry. For instance, intermediate
product imports are tax-exempted.
Fertilizer consumption is around 5 million tons a year63, a third of which
60Also known as potash.
61Fertilizers are either organic or inorganic (artificial).
62Two of which belong to the government and Igsas¸ is one of them.
63See DPT (2000), p. viii.
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is imports as stated above. Exports are around 40,000-70,000 tons a year64.
Demand is highly seasonal, peaking in spring and fall. Demand for fertilizer
is price inelastic in developed countries because there are no close substitutes.
However, it is elastic in developing countries because there are substitutes as
manure or other organic materials65.
The reporters in the case determined that each one of nitrogen, phosphorus,
potassium, and composed fertilizers is a relevant product market by itself be-
cause they cannot be substituted for each other. The reporters concluded that
if I˙gsas¸ were taken over by Toros, Toros would not be in a dominant position
in the composed fertilizers market. However, they added that Toros would be
in a dominant position in the nitrogen fertilizers market. Based on the report,
the Competition Board made its decision on November 3, 200066. The Board’s
decision basically repeated the reporters’ claims in the case and as a result the
Authority prohibited the merger.
As in any merger case, the key point in that case is the definition of the
relevant product and geographic markets. The reporters’ claim that each single-
nutrient fertilizer and multi-nutrient fertilizers are separate relevant product
markets, based on their degree of substitutability among each other, is actually
an empirical issue. Also if there are regional markets in the fertilizer industry
and Toros and I˙gsas¸ are in different geographical markets, then Toros might
not be in a dominant position after the merger. More specifically, Toros has
two plants, which are located in mid-south of Turkey. Igsas’ plant is in the
north-west of Turkey. The Authority determined the geographical market as
the whole country. However, if this is not true, then the merger will not affect
the market structure in each reginal market. The only change will be in the
form of ownership.
It seems that the Authority based its decision only on market share ar-
gument, which may not be correct. The point is whether the merged com-
pany would have such market power to be able to decrease production and
increase prices large and long enough so it will make substantial profits at the
expense of consumers. This does not seem possible for a couple of reasons.
First, there is the possibility of substitution among different fertilizer types.
For instance, Boyle (1982) confirms the earlier findings that phosphorus and
potassium are substitutable for nitrogen although not for each other. Second,
import-penetration is high in the fertilizer market. The Authority’s conclusion
that importers have a minor share in total sales misses the point. It is not
important that importers’ share is not large. What is important is that their
pressure is there. Low imports may be the result of low domestic prices. Once
fertilizer prices go up, imports may increase. Third, buyers, supported by the
government, have a considerable degree of power and apply a downward pressure
on prices. It does not seem likely for any company to charge monopoly prices.
Fourth, there is the possibility that producers of other fertilizer types will start
64See DPT (2000), p. viii.
65See Korol and Larivire (1998).
66Notice that the decision was made two years after the application by the HBP. This is an
extraordinarily long time for a merger case.
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to produce nitrogen fertilizer if the merged company increases its prices. In sum,
there are three types of economic actors in the Turkish fertilizer industry that
will prevent any producer from charging monopoly prices. They are importers,
the government, and other producers. And finally, one can put forward a failing
firm argument for I˙gsas¸. Production activities in I˙gsas¸ stopped as a result of the
1999 earthquake. The merger would bring back its productive resources to the
economy. For the reasons cited above, we believe that prohibiting the merger
was not the right decision for the Authority.
7 Conclusion
Until 1980s, the Turkish economy was a relatively closed economy. Most of the
production activities were carried out by inefficient and bulky state-run compa-
nies. Investments were initiated by governments but mostly for political reasons.
All of these changed in the 1980s. Since then, the state has been withdrawing
from economic activities through privatization and opening up the economy
to free trade. It should, however, be noted that, despite this trend toward a
free-market economy, Turkey would not have adapted a competition policy this
soon if it was not for the effort to become integrated to the European Union.
Whatever the reason is, the outcomes of this effort, especially the competition
laws and their implementation, have been paying off.
A number of conclusions can be offered based on the analysis in the paper.
We divide these conclusions into two parts: those concerning legislation and
those concerning implementation. We first start with the legislation part, and
then move on to the implementation part.
Competition laws need a well-established and swift legislation process. This
is hardly the case in developing countries like Turkey where even the simplest
lawsuits may take years to finalize. The current legislative structure allows
the Authority to collect monetary penalties only after an appeal results in its
favor. One of the biggest challenges the Turkish Competition Authority faces
is the slow appeal process, which basically depreciates any monetary penalties.
Since firms are aware of this, they appeal every decision and get advantage
of the slowness of the Turkish justice system. As a result, the Authority has
not been able to collect any administrative fines to date. This fact renders the
effectiveness of the Authority a questionable one 67.
Competition policy in Turkey still needs articles concerning state aids and
undertakings with special or exclusive rights (including public undertakings).
As stated before, the Additional Protocol, signed between Turkey and the EC
on December 13, 1970, anticipated that Turkey would adopt the conditions and
rules for the application of the principles laid down in Articles 85, 86, 90 and
92 of the Treaty of Rome68. Articles 85 and 86 have corresponding articles in
67At the time of writing, a new draft law appeared. The new law aims to address some
problems of the current law. The most important of them is the new penalty system, in which
the Authority is authorized to collect the penalty as soon as a decision is made.
68Articles 81, 82, 86, and 88 in the Treaty of Amsterdam.
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the Law on the Protection of Competition, namely Articles 4 and 6. However,
despite the fact that Turkey and the EC have been in customs union since
1996, competition laws in Turkey still lack articles corresponding to Article
90 (public undertakings and undertakings with special or exclusive rights) and
Article 92 (state aids). The issue of state aids will be more important if Turkey
becomes a full member of the EU. But it is probably a good idea to discipline
domestic industries and the government authorities regarding state aids as soon
as possible. This may bring Turkey closer to the full membership and also make
the transformation easier.
Since the Law on the Protection of Competition was prepared observing the
EU competition laws, its general structure is well formed. However, we want to
point out a problem with Article 4, of which paragraph 3 states that
In cases where the existence of an agreement cannot be proved, if
the price changes or the balance of supply and demand or the areas
of activity in the markets of the enterprises concerned are similar
to those of the markets where competition is prevented, distorted or
restricted, this constitutes a presumption that the enterprises con-
cerned are engaged in a concerted practice.
Each such party thereto may avoid liability if the contrary is proven
on economic and rational grounds.
We should emphasize that this paragraph has no counterpart in the Treaty
of Amsterdam. This is a particularly problematic paragraph from an economic
point of view. The paragraph basically states that if the Authority suspects that
an infringement occurred but cannot prove it, it is up to the parties involved
to prove that there is no such an infringement. We think that this paragraph
should be completely removed from the Law. There are many practical difficul-
ties in implementing it. For instance, how will the Authority conclude that the
price changes or the balance of supply and demand are similar to those of the
markets where competition is prevented, distorted, or restricted? Moreover, is
there a specific pattern in the price changes or the balance of supply and demand
in the markets where competition is prevented, distorted, or restricted so that
the Authority will be able to compare the case at hand to it? If there is such a
pattern, then the task of competition authorities is very easy. All they have to
do is to compare the actual price changes or the balance of supply and demand
to those of the markets where competition is prevented, distorted, or restricted.
If the existence of an agreement cannot be proved, then the Authority should
conclude that there is no such an agreement and, thus, there is no competition
infringement. Taking the investigation one step further and attempting to com-
pare the price changes or the balance of supply and demand of a market in which
the Authority believes an infringement occurred to those of the markets where
competition is prevented, distorted, or restricted will bring a lot of speculation
with it. The paragraph also implies that if there is an competition infringement
in an area of activity in any market, then all of the similar areas of activity
are under suspicion. One competition expert we interviewed claimed that this
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paragraph makes their job easier. However, he could not remember any specific
case, in which the Authority had recourse to it.
As to the implementation of competition policy, our main conclusion is about
the way the relevant geographic markets are defined. It seems that in most of
the cases the way the relevant geographic markets are defined is somewhat
heuristic. First of all, we should stress that the Small but Significant Non-
transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test has never been used in any case. The
SSNIP test, which has been adopted by the European Commission, emphasizes
demand substitution as the main element in defining the relevant geographic
market69. On the other hand, the relevant geographic market definitions of the
Turkish Competition Authority were mainly supply-sided and ignored demand-
side effects. For instance, the relevant geographic market was most of the time
defined as the extent of an area to which a specific supplier or a group of suppliers
have the means to supply. Econometric or statistical tools are almost never used
in defining markets, even in cases where the geographic market definition plays
a vital role. The arguments about market definition were restricted to a few
short paragraphs in most of the cases. Another problem is that the largest
geographical market is almost always Turkey. It seems that there is a general
consensus among the experts that the largest geographical market should be
defined the whole country because the Law cannot be applied outside Turkey.
Their main argument for this is Article 2 of the Law70. However, Article 2 does
not prevent one from defining a geographical market larger than Turkey since
it states that
Agreements, decisions, and practices which prevent, distort or re-
strict competition between the enterprises which operate in or af-
fect the goods and services markets in the territory of Republic of
Turkey...71
Thus, Article 2 clearly states that geographic markets can be defined larger than
Turkey. This is going to be more important if Turkey becomes a full member of
the EU. We believe that the competition experts in the Authority should begin
this exercise.
Another problem regarding the implementation of competition policy is that
there is no monitoring department that follows up on investigated undertakings
to see if they stopped the actions that led to the investigation. For instance, in
the Belko case we covered above, the competition experts we interviewed stated
that Belko is no longer the sole importer and seller of domestic coal in Ankara.
However, Belko still claims to have the exclusive rights. This problem does not
seem likely to be solved because of the shortage of staff.
One minor point is that each investigation committee is composed of one
board member and two or more competition experts. The Board, based on the
report of the investigation committee, decides a case on a voting basis. Each
69See Jones and Sufrin (2001), pp. 43-44.
70See the appendix.
71Emphasis mine.
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board member votes in favor of or against penalty and cases are decided on
either a majority vote or a unanimous vote. The board member who is also
in the investigation committee has a vote for the case. In order to create an
environment as impartial as possible for undertakings, we believe the board
member, who is also in the investigation committee, should not take part in
voting.
The integration process of Turkey with Europe is not over since Turkey is
still not a full member of the EU. But Turkey has made great progress towards
the full integration. One of the most notable achievements was to pass the Law
on the Protection of Competition, which was required for the customs unions
between Turkey and the EU. However, a careful assessment of the possible
market performance effects of competition policy in Turkey is much needed.
This is our agenda for future research.
Appendix
This appendix includes some of the articles of the Law on Protection of Com-
petition that is refereed to in the text.
PART I
Purpose, Scope, Definitions
Scope
Article 2. Agreements, decisions, and practices which prevent, distort or
restrict competition between the enterprises which operate in or affect the goods
and services markets in the territory of Republic of Turkey and the abuse of
dominant position by those enterprises which are dominant in the market and
all kinds of operations and practices which are considered to be a merger or an
acquisition by which competition in the market is significantly impeded and all
operations concerning the measures, decisions, regulation and supervision for
the protection of competition are within the scope of this Law.
LAW ON THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION
(LAW NO. 4054)
[Published in Official Gazette No. 22140 dated 13 December 1994]
PART I
Purpose, Scope, Definitions
Definitions
Article 3. For the purposes of this Law:
Dominant Position: shall mean any position enjoyed in a certain market
by one or more enterprises by virtue of which, those enterprises have the power to
act independently of their competitors and purchasers in determining economic
parameters such as the amount of production or distribution, price and supply;
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PART II
CHAPTER ONE
Prohibited Practices
Agreements, Concerted Practices and Decisions Restricting
Competition
Article 4. Agreements and concerted practices of the enterprises and de-
cisions and practices of the associations of enterprises the object or effect or
the possible impact of which is, directly or indirectly, to prevent, distort or re-
strict competition in a certain market for goods and services, are unlawful and
prohibited.
Such practices are, in particular, as follows:
a) To fix purchase or sales prices or the factors such as cost or profit which
form the price or all other trading conditions concerning purchase and sales of
goods and services;
b) To share the markets for goods and services or to share or control the
market sources and components;
c) To control or to determine the quantities of supply or demand in the
markets for goods and services outside the market conditions;
d) To impede or restrict the activities of the competitors or to eliminate
other enterprises operating in the market by boycotts or by other practices or
to prevent the newcomers in the market;
e) Except exclusive dealing agreements, to apply dissimilar conditions to
persons which have equivalent transactions with equal rights and obligations;
f) Contrary to the nature of the agreement or to the commercial customary
rules, to make the conclusion of contracts subject to the purchase of other goods
and services or acceptance by the intermediary purchasers to display of other
goods and services or acceptance of resale conditions for the goods or services
concerned.
In cases where the existence of an agreement cannot be proved, if the price
changes or the balance of supply and demand or the areas of activity in the
markets of the enterprises concerned are similar to those of the markets where
competition is prevented, distorted or restricted, this constitutes a presumption
that the enterprises concerned are engaged in a concerted practice.
Each such party thereto may avoid liability if the contrary is proven on
economic and rational grounds.
Exemption
Article 5. The Board, in the existence of all the conditions stated below and
upon the application of the parties concerned, may declare the provisions of Ar-
ticle 4 inapplicable to any agreement or concerted practice between enterprises
or decision by associations of enterprises which:
a) Contributes to new developments and progress or technical or economic
improvement in production or distribution of goods and in providing services;
b) Allows consumers to get a share from the resulting benefit;
42
and which does not:
c) Eliminate competition in a substantial part of the relevant market;
d) Induce a restraint on competition that is more than essential for the
attainment of the objectives set out in paragraphs (a) and (b);
A decision for exemption shall be issued for a specified period of not more
than five years. Certain conditions and/or obligations may be attached to an
exemption decision. Upon the termination of the specified period of exemption,
the decision for exemption may, upon the application of the parties concerned,
be renewed if the requirements for exemption continue to be satisfied.
In cases where the requirements stated in the first paragraph are satisfied,
the Board may issue communique´s by which certain categories of agreements
shall be exempted as a group and the conditions attached thereto are shown.
Abuse of Dominant Position
Article 6. Any abuse, by one or more enterprises acting alone or by means
of agreements or practices, of a dominant position in a market for goods and
services within the whole or part of the territory of the State, is unlawful and
prohibited.
Abusive practices are, in particular, as follows:
a) To prevent, directly or indirectly, other enterprises in its area of commer-
cial activities or practices which aim to impede the activities of the competitors
in the market;
b) To make discrimination, directly or indirectly, by way of imposing dissim-
ilar conditions for equivalent and same rights and obligations to the purchasers
who have equivalent position;
c) To make the conclusion of contracts subject to the acceptance of re-
strictions concerning resale conditions such as the purchase of other goods and
services or acceptance by the intermediary purchasers to display other goods
and services or maintenance of a minimum resale price;
d) Practices which aim to distort competition in a market for goods and
services by means of taking financial, technological and commercial advantages
created by the dominant position in another market;
e) To restrict production, marketing or technical development thereby caus-
ing a disadvantage for the consumers.
Mergers and Acquisitions
Article 7 Merger of two or more enterprises and acquisition, except ac-
quisition by way of inheritance, by an enterprise or by a person, of another
enterprise, either by acquisition of all or part of its assets or securities or other
means by which that person or enterprise acquires a controlling power in that
enterprise concerned, which creates or strengthens the dominant position of one
or more enterprises as a result of which, competition is significantly impeded in
the market for goods and services in the whole or part of the territory of the
State, is unlawful and prohibited.
43
The Board, shall issue communique´s to announce the categories of mergers
and acquisitions which, to be considered as legally valid, require a permission
by prior notification to the Board.
CHAPTER TWO
Powers of the Board
Negative Clearance
Article 8. Upon application by an enterprise or associations of enterprises
concerned, the Board, on the basis of the facts in its possession, may certify
by a negative clearance certificate that the agreement, decision, practice or the
merger or acquisition, is not contrary to the Articles 4, 6 and 7 of this Law.
The Board, after issuing a negative clearance certificate, may revoke its
decision at any time, within the framework of the conditions set out in Article
13. However, in such a case, no punitive sanctions shall be applied to the parties
concerned, for the period until the revocation decision of the Board.
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